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Abstract
Masking is one of the efﬁcient and easily implemented countermeasures to protect cryptographic algo-
rithms in such resource limited environments as smart-cards from differential power analysis as well as simple
power analysis that were ﬁrst introduced by Kocher et al. in 1999. To defend differential power analysis at-
tacks, Akkar and Giraud presented a Transformed Masking Method and applied it to DES implementation
in 2001. Unfortunately, in 2003, Akkar and Goubin showed a superposition attack that actually is a high-
order differential power analysis attack on Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed
Masking Method, and ﬁnally they presented a DES implementation using their proposed Unique Masking
Method to defend any order differential power analysis attacks, which was later improved by Akkar, Bévan
and Goubin in 2004. In this paper, by exploiting a new artiﬁce to classify the electric consumption curves,
we show that Akkar, Bévan and Goubin’s improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method
is still vulnerable to a high-order differential power analysis attack. Besides, we ﬁnd it is also vulnerable to
a superposition attack. We also present four new differential power analysis attacks on Akkar and Giraud’s
DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method.
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1. Introduction
Lucifer, a block cipher designed by IBM in 1971, was selected as the Data Encryption Standard
(DES) [13] byNIST [27] in 1977. Since then, DES has been extensively adopted to protect the privacy
of the users and the transaction data in a large number of security service applications, say e-com-
merce, ﬁnancial service and smart-cards. In the meantime, it has always been the target of many
cryptanalysts and there have been quite a lot cryptanalytic results on it during the past nearly thirty
years, of which differential cryptanalysis [4] and linear cryptanalysis [22] are two most well-known
attacks. These attacks exploit mathematically statistical characteristics between a cipher’s inputs
and outputs, especially between inputs and outputs of its S-boxes, but do not take its software or
hardware implementations into consideration.
However, electronic components are not usually perfectly tamperproof, and they may leak
certain sensitive information on the algorithm from some side channels when an embedded
cryptographic algorithm is executed, such as the timing of algorithm operations, power con-
sumption and etc. In 1996, by carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform pri-
vate key operations, Kocher [17] succeeded to exhibit the ﬁrst side-channel attack that might
ﬁnd ﬁxed Difﬁe–Hellman exponents [12], factor RSA keys [31], and break other cryptosystems.
In 1997, Boneh et al. [7] presented another kind of side channel attack—fault analysis, which
relies on the fact that hardware faults and errors that occur during the operations of a cryp-
tographic device might leak information about the private key. Subsequently, by combining
differential cryptanalysis and fault analysis, Biham and Shamir [6] presented a differential fault
analysis attack, which is also applicable to secret key cryptosystems, for example, DES. In 1998,
Kocher et al. [18] introduced a new kind of side channel attack—power analysis that includes
simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA), and they published them
[19] in 1999. Power analysis starts from the fact that the attacker can get much more informa-
tion than the knowledge of the inputs and the outputs during the execution of the algorithm,
such as the electric consumption or electromagnetic radiations of the circuit devices, then tries
to extract information about the secret key of a cryptographic algorithm by studying the power
consumption of the electronic devices during the execution of the algorithm. Its initial focus
was on DES, but soon was extended to other symmetrical cryptosystems and some public key
cryptosystems, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) candidates [8,15,23].
To secure cryptographic algorithms against DPA attacks, two main countermeasure catego-
ries have been presented so far. The ﬁrst is the splitting method due to Goubin and Patarin
[15] and Char et al. [9], which consists in “splitting” all the intermediate variables using some
secret sharing principle; The second is the boolean masking method due to Messerges [25],
which “masks” all the intermediate data if all the fundamental operations used in a given
algorithm can be rewritten with masked input data, giving masked output data. A drawback
of the splitting method is that it greatly increases the computation time and the memory
required, which is a weakness in some constrained environments such as smart-cards, while
the masking method is easy and efﬁcient to be implemented in some algorithms, for example
DES, and it has received extensive research [10,11,16]. In 2001, to counteract the DPA attack,
Akkar and Giraud [1] presented a Transformed Masking Method and applied it to DES im-
plementation. The main idea of this masking method is to perform all the computation such
that all the data are XORed with a random mask. Moreover, the S-Boxes are modiﬁed such
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that the output of a round is masked by the same mask as the input. Both the two main
methods have been proven to be secure against the initial DPA attacks, and are now widely
used in real-world implementations of many algorithms. Unfortunately, they do not take into
consideration more elaborated attacks, called “High-Order DPA” [19,24,26], which consist in
studying correlations between the secret data and several points of the electric consumption
curves. In 2003, Akkar and Goubin [2] showed that Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementa-
tion using the Transformed Masking Method was also vulnerable to such a High-Order DPA
attack. To protect some secret-key cryptographic algorithms against any order DPA attack,
they introduced a new countermeasure called Unique Masking Method, and applied it to DES
implementation. However, recently, based on the fact that the output of the S-Box of the sec-
ond round is unmasked, Akkar, Bévan and Goubin [3] presented an enhanced DPA attack
on Akkar and Goubin’s DES implementation using Unique Masking Method, and they ﬁ-
nally gave an improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method to avoid the
enhanced DPA attack. Most recently, there were new advances in power analysis, as follows.
Based on the Davies–Murphy attack [5,14], Kunz-Jacques et al. [20] presented a new kind of
High-Order DPA attack on DES, called Davies–Murphy power attack that is more elaborated
than ordinary High-Order DPA attacks. In [30], Prouff studied certain properties of S-boxes
with respect to DPA attacks.
In this paper, we investigate the security of two DES implementations, the Akkar, Bévan and
Goubin’s improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method and the Akkar and
Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method, against High-Order DPA
attacks. By exploiting a new artiﬁce to classify the electric consumption curves corresponding
to the inputs, we show that Akkar Bévan and Goubin’s improved DES implementation using
Unique Masking Method is still vulnerable to a DPA attack that uses the outputs of the S-Box-
es of the ﬁrst two rounds. Besides, we ﬁnd that it is also vulnerable to a superposition attack.
Finally, by using the outputs of the S-Boxes of the ﬁrst two rounds, or the last two rounds, or
the second round and the last round, or the ﬁrst round and the last second round, we present
four new DPA attacks on Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking
Method.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe DPA and High-Or-
der DPA attacks. In Section 3, we brieﬂy review Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using
TransformedMaskingMethod, Akkar and Goubin’s DES implementation using UniqueMasking
Method, and Akkar Bévan and Goubin’s improved DES implementation using Unique Masking
Method. In Section 4, we show our High-Order DPA attacks on Akkar Bévan and Goubin’s im-
proved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method. In Section 5, we present four new
High-Order DPA attacks on Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Mask-
ing Method. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Description of DPA and High-Order DPA attacks
DPA is an attack that allows to obtain information about the secret key (contained in a smart-
card for example), by performing a statistical analysis of the electric consumption recordsmeasured
for a large number of computations with the same key.
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The DPA attack on the DES can be performed as follows (cited from [15]):
Step 1: We measure the consumption on the ﬁrst round, for 1000 (for example) DES com-
putations. We denote by M1, . . . ,M1000 the input values of those 1000 computations.
We denote by C1, . . . ,C1000 the 1000 electric consumption curves measured during the
computations. We also compute the mean curve MC of those 1000 consumption
curves.
Step 2: We focus for instance on the ﬁrst output bit (as the target bit) of the ﬁrst S-Box during the
ﬁrst round. Let b be the value of that bit. It is easy to see that b depends on only 6 bits of
the secret key. We make an hypothesis on the involved 6 bits. We compute the expected
(theoretical) values for b from those 6 bits and from theMi (i = 1, . . . , 1000). This enables us
to separate the 1000 inputs M1, . . . ,M1000 into two categories: those giving b = 0 and those
giving b = 1.
Step 3: We now compute the mean MC0 of the curves corresponding to inputs of the ﬁrst cat-
egory (i.e., the one for which b = 0). If MC and MC0 show an appreciable difference in
a statistical meaning (i.e., a difference much greater than the standard deviation of the
measured noise), we consider that the chosen values for the 6 key bits were correct. If
MC and MC0 do not show any sensible difference, we repeat step 2 with another choice
for the 6 bits.
Step 4: We repeat steps 2 and 3 with a “target” bit b in the second S-Box, the third, . . ., until the
eighth S-Box. As a result, we ﬁnally obtain 48 bits of the secret key.
Step 5: The remaining 8 bits can be found by exhaustive search.
This attack does not require any knowledge about the individual electric consumption of
each instruction, nor about the position in time of each of these instructions. It applies ex-
actly the same way as soon as the attacker knows the outputs of the algorithm and the
corresponding consumption curves. It only relies on the following fundamental hypothesis
[2]:
Fundamental Hypothesis 1 (Order 1). There exists an intermediate variable, that appears during the
computation of the algorithm, such that knowing a few key bits (in practice less than 32 bits) allows
to decide whether two inputs (respectively two outputs) give or not the same value for a known
function of this variable.
High-Order DPA attacks generalize the DPA: the attacker now compute statistical correlations
between the electrical consumptions considered at several instants. More precisely, an nth order
DPA attack takes into account n values of the consumption signal, which correspond to n inter-
mediate values occurring during the computation. These attacks rely on the following fundamental
hypothesis [2],
Fundamental Hypothesis 2 (Order n). There exists a set of n intermediate variables, that appear
during the computation of the algorithm, such that knowing a few key bits (in practice less than 32
bits) allows to decide whether two inputs (respectively two outputs) give or not the same value for
a known function of these n variables.
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3. Review of the DES implementations using Transformed Masking Method and Unique Masking
Method
3.1. Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method and Following
Attacks
In this section, we will brieﬂy describe Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Trans-
formed Masking Method [1] and Akkar and Goubin’s attack [2]. We refer the reader to [1,2] for
details if our description is hard to follow.
3.1.1. Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method
Transformed Masking Method, introduced by Akkar and Giraud [1], is to perform all the com-
putation that all the data are XORed with a randommask. By using suitably modiﬁed S-Boxes, it is
possible to have the output of a round masked by exactly the same mask that masks the input. The
computation is thus divided into two main steps: the ﬁrst one consists in generating the modiﬁed S-
Boxes, and the second one consists in applying the usual computation using these modiﬁed S-Boxes
with the initial input being masked before starting DES and the ﬁnal output being unmasked after
DES.
Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method is as follows.
One chooses a 64-bit randommask X that will be XORedwith the 64-bit messageM at the begin-
ning of the DES. Then he starts DES with the valueM ⊕ X . When it passes the Initial Permutation,
the output value will become IP(M)⊕ IP(X), where IP represents the Initial Permutation. At this
point, the right and left 32 bits will respectively be IP(M)32–63 ⊕ IP(X)32−63 and
IP(M)0−31 ⊕ IP(X)0−31. (1)
Just before the S-Box after E permutation, there will be an intermediary mask E(IP(X)32−63), where
E represents the Expansive Permutation of a DES round. To reestablish the mask IP(X) at each
round, Akkar and Giraud used a modiﬁed S-Box, denoted by SM-Box. The output of the SM-Box,
after the permutation P following S-Box and after being XORed with the left part of the masked
message,must have amask equal to IP(X)32−63. Tomeet this requirement,Akkar andGirauddeﬁned
the SM-Box as:
SM-Box(A) = S(A⊕ E(IP(X)32−63))⊕ P−1(IP(X)0−31 ⊕ IP(X)32−63),
where A is the input of SM-Box, S represents the original DES S-Box function and P−1 denotes
the inverse of the permutation P following the S-Box. Therefore, after the input E(IP(M)32−63)⊕
E(IP(X)32−63)⊕ K1 passes the SM-Box, the value will be
SM-Box(E(IP(M)32−63)⊕ E(IP(X)32−63)⊕ K1)
= S(E(IP(M)32−63)⊕ K1)⊕ P−1(IP(X)0−31 ⊕ IP(X)32−63). (2)
After the value of Eq. (2) passes the P permutation and XORed with the left 32 bits, the value will
become
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P(S(E(IP(M)32−63)⊕ K1)⊕ P−1(IP(X)0−31 ⊕ IP(X)32−63))
⊕IP(M)0−31 ⊕ IP(X)0−31
= P(S(E(IP(M)32−63)⊕ K1))⊕ IP(M)0−31 ⊕ IP(X)32−63.
At the same time, the right 32 bits IP(M)32−63 ⊕ IP(X)32−63 will become the new left 32 bits.Note that
the new left 32-bit value has a mask IP(X)32−63 that is different from the previous left 32-bit mask
IP(X)0−31 in Eq. (1). To implement easily in the following rounds, Akkar and Giraud XORed this
new left 32-bit value IP(M)32−63 ⊕ IP(X)32−63 with IP(X)0−31 ⊕ IP(X)32−63 before executing further,
so that the left 32-bit value has the same mask as in Eq. (1).
Similarly, after executing the left ﬁfteen rounds, the output of the ﬁnal round will have a mask
IP(X)0−31||IP(X)32−63, where ‖ denotes string concatenation. Since the left right 32 bits and the right
32 bits will interchange before the Final Permutation, so again for the easy implementation, Akkar
and Giraud XORed both the right and left 32 bits of the ﬁnal round with IP(X)0−31 ⊕ IP(X)32−63.
So the mask just before the Final Permutation will become IP(X)0−31||IP(X)32−63, which will be-
come X after Final Permutation IP−1. Finally, by taking XOR of the value after Final Permutation
with the mask X , one can recover the output of the message as the same output in a DES without
countermeasures.
Note that there is always a random mask during each round, so it could prevent the initial DPA
attack.
However, Akkar and Goubin [2] showed recently that it cannot withstand a High-Order DPA
attack. Now let’s brieﬂy describe Akkar and Goubin’s attacks in the following section.
3.1.2. Akkar and Goubin’s attacks on Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed
Masking Method
Usual Second-Order DPA. In [2], Akkar andGoubin pointed out that their DES Implementation
using TransformedMaskingMethod is subject to a second-order DPA attack. And the real output
of the S-Boxes is correlated to the masked value and the random value, as a result, after getting the
electrical trace of these two values, one can combine them and get a trace on which a classical DPA
attack will work. In order to perform efﬁciently such an attack, the attacker should know precisely
where the interesting values are manipulated.
Superposition Attack. Akkar and Goubin’s superposition attack is a second-order DPA attack
in theory, but in practice, it is nearly as simple as an usual DPA attack. The idea is as following: in
a second order DPA attack, the most difﬁcult thing is to localize the time when the precise needed
values are manipulated, but on the contrary, localizing a whole DES round is often quite easy. So
instead of correlating precise part of the consumption traces, the attacker will just correlate the
whole trace of the ﬁrst and the last round. With this method, one can notice that the attacker will
have the following value T that is the XOR of the two values of the S-Boxes in the ﬁrst and the last
rounds:
T = (S(E(R15)⊕ K16)⊕ P−1(IP(X)32−63 ⊕ IP(X)0−31))
⊕(S(E(IP(M)32−63)⊕ K1)⊕ P−1(IP(X)32−63 ⊕ IP(X)0−31))
= S(E(R15)⊕ K16)⊕ S(E(IP(M)32−63)⊕ K1),
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where R15 are the right part of the output (corresponding to the inputM and the same keys) of the
15th round in a DES without countermeasures.
Note that the value T does not depend on the randommasking value and that R15 can be deduced
from the output by applying the inverse of the Final Permutation IP−1. Therefore, it is easy to see
that after making a hypothesis on the 2× 6 bits of the sub-key of the ﬁrst and last round, it is
possible to determine the XORed value of the output of the S-Boxes of the ﬁrst and last round.
After that one can perform an usual DPA attack and ﬁnd the values of the different sub-keys of K1
and K16.
3.2. Akkar, Bévan and Goubin’s improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method
In this section, we will brieﬂy describe the Unique Masking Method proposed by Akkar et al.
and its application to DES implementation to defend DPA attack. We refer the reader to [2] for
details.
3.2.1. Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Unique Masking Method
Unique Masking Method aims at providing a generic protection against any order DPA. The
two principles of this method is ﬁrst to mask only the values that depend on less than 32 bits of
the key in order to prevent DPA, and second intermediate independent variables depending on less
than 32 bits of the key should not be masked by the same value in order to thwart High-Order
DPA.
Given any 32-bit value , Akkar et al. ﬁrst deﬁned two new functions Ŝ1 and Ŝ2 based on the
original DES S-Box function S:
{∀x ∈ [0, 1]48 : Ŝ1(x) = S(x ⊕ E())
∀x ∈ [0, 1]48 : Ŝ2(x) = S(x)⊕ P−1() .
Then, they deﬁned fKi to be the composition of the four transformations E, the XOR with the ith
round subkey Ki the S-Box and the permutation P . Finally, they deﬁned f̂1,Ki and f̂2,Ki by replacing
S in fKi with Ŝ1 and Ŝ2.
Using the function fKi , f̂1,Ki and f̂2,Ki , they obtained the following ﬁve different rounds using
masked or unmasked values:
• A: The left and the right parts of the input are unmasked, and the function is fKi . Therefore, the
left and the right parts of the output will also be unmasked.
• B: The left and the right parts of the input are unmasked, but the function is f̂2,Ki . Therefore, the
left part of the output will be unmasked, but the right part will be masked.
• C: The left part of the input is unmasked, but the right part is masked, and the function is f̂1,Ki .
Therefore, the left part of the output will be masked while the right part will be unmasked.
• D: The left part of the input is masked, but the right part is unmasked, and the function
is fKi . Therefore, the left part of the output will be unmasked while the right part will be
masked.
• E: The left part of the input is masked, but the right part is unmasked, and the function is f̂2,Ki .
Therefore, the left or the right part of the output will be unmasked.
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To defend any order DPA attack, they gave a compatible 16 roundDES implementation as follows:
IP − B1C1D1C1D1C1E1B2C2D2C2D2C2D2C2E2 − FP , where FP represents the Final
Permutation of DES without countermeasures and Bi (Ci ,Di) denotes that the round is a B-type
(respectively, C-type and D-type) with the mask i (i = 1, 2).
Furthermore, they pointed out that if one wants the mask never to appear several times, even on
values depending on more than 36 bits of the key, one can use the following combination instead
of the above one: IP − B1C1E1AAAAAAAAAAB2C2E2 − FP . It is even possible to add two new
masks and to mask every values depending on less than 56 bits of the key.
However, Akkar et al. [3] showed in FSE’04 that the above DES implementation using Unique
MaskingMethod is vulnerable to an enhanced DPA attack, and ﬁnally they gave an improvement,
which will be brieﬂy described in the following section.
3.2.2. Akkar, Bévan and Goubin’s improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method
For all the proposed sequences of rounds in last section, the second round is always a C-type
round. The output of the S-Box of this second round is
S (E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63)))⊕ IP(M)0−31 ⊕ 1)⊕ K2 ⊕ E(1))
= S(E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))))⊕ K2 ⊕ E(IP(M)0−31)), (3)
which is unmasked and stay unmasked after being XORed with the left part of the message.
Akkar et al. [3] pointed out that the fact that the output of the second round S-Boxes is
unmasked will be vulnerable, for one can take the underlined value in Eq. (3) as the data to
be acquired by a DPA attack. Based on this point, they presented a DPA attack on the above
DES implementation using Unique Masking Method. The main idea of the attack is to retrieve
two intermediate values which are not protected against DPA, and then to get the key bits by
solving an equation involving the two intermediate values. The attack includes the following
three parts:
• First Part:
(1) The attacker performs DES computations with some chosen messagesMi (ı = 1, 2, . . . , 1000)
for which the right part IP(Mi)32−63 of the messageMi after IP will be set to an arbitrary but
constant R0. The left part L0,i will be random.
(2) The attacker then performs a ﬁrst-order DPA attack on the input of each S-Box of the sec-
ond round. Because the output of the S-Boxes is unmasked, he will determine the value of the
second round key XORed with the unknown but constant output of the S-Boxes of the ﬁrst
round. The found value will be:
 = K2 ⊕ E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(R0)))).
• Second Part:
(1) Similarly, the attacker performs another ﬁrst-order DPAwith other messages with a different
known constant value R∗0, which will provide:
∗ = K2 ⊕ E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(R∗0)))).
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• Final Part:
(1) By takingXORof the two values found at last two parts, the attacker can obtain the following
value:
⊕∗= (K2⊕E(P(S(K1⊕E(R0)))))⊕(K2⊕E(P(S(K1⊕E(R∗0))))).
The value K2 vanishes and the linearity of functions E and P gives the attacker the equation:
S(K1 ⊕ E(R0))⊕ S(K1 ⊕ E(R∗0)) = P−1(E−1(⊕ ∗)), (4)
where E−1 is the inverse of E permutation.
(2) Because the attacker knows R0 and R∗0, doing a exhaustive search on each 6-bit subkey of K1,
will give him all the possible values for the subkey K1. On average, the differential properties
of S will give him about 4 possibilities for each subkey. Since there are 8 subkeys and he also
needs to ﬁnd the 8 bits that are not in K1, this gives him 48 · 28 = 224 possibilities on the key.
So an exhaustive search with one known plaintext/ciphertext pair will take only a few seconds
on a PC.
Finally, to improve the DES implementation by masking the output of the second round, they
pointed out that one can use a different mask but the use of 1 is not forbidden since the bits that
are masked by the same value depends on 42 bits of the key, so they deﬁned one more function
f̂3,Ki with the modiﬁed S-Boxes Ŝ3(x) such that ∀x ∈ [0, 1]48 : Ŝ3(x ⊕ E(1)) = S(x)⊕ P−1(1). Here-
after, the output of the S-Boxes of the second round in the improved DES implementation will
be
S(E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63)))⊕ IP(M)0−31 ⊕ 1)⊕ K2)
= S(E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))))⊕ E(IP(M)0−31)⊕ E(1)⊕ K2)
= S(E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))))⊕ K2 ⊕ E(IP(M)0−31))⊕ P−1(1). (5)
Note that every encryption there will be a random and different value P−1(1) that is unknown to
the attacker in Eq. (5), so the attacker cannot any longer classify correctly the messageMi into two
groups, which seems to disable the above attack.
4. Our attacks on Akkar, Bévan and Goubin’s improved DES implementation using Unique
Masking Method
By using the outputs of the S-Boxes of the ﬁrst two rounds in Akkar et al.’s improved DES
implementation using Unique Masking Method, we could perform a DPA attack on it. Our attack
is a chosen plaintext attack. Besides, it was also vulnerable to a superposition attack similar to the
one in Section 3.1.2.
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4.1. Main idea of our attack
Based on the fact that there is the same mask during the outputs of the S-Boxes of the ﬁrst two
rounds inAkkar et al.’s improvedDES implementation usingUniqueMaskingMethod, our attacks
are also to retrieve two intermediate values which are not protected against DPA by adopting a
new technique to classify the electric consumption curves corresponding to the inputs, and then to
get the key bits by solving an equation involving the two intermediate values. The new technique is
crucial to successfully perform our attacks.
During Akkar et al.’s improved DES implementation using UniqueMaskingMethod in Section
3.2.2, we can see that:
Step 1: The output of the S-Box of the ﬁrst round is
S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))⊕ P−1(1). (6)
Step 2: The output of the S-Box of the second round is Eq. (5).
Step 3: By taking XOR of the two values of Eqs. (5) and (6) (i.e. XOR the outputs of the S-Boxes
of the ﬁrst and second rounds), then we get the following Eq. (7):
S (E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63)))⊕ IP(M)0−31 ⊕ 1)⊕ K2)
⊕S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))⊕ P−1(1)
= S(E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))))⊕ K2 ⊕ E(IP(M)0−31))⊕ S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63)). (7)
Therefore, the random value P−1(1) vanishes.
From Section 2, we learn that during a DPA attack, the attacker has to compute the value of the
target bit and then classiﬁes the electric consumption curves according to this value. Note that in
Akkar et al.’s enhancedDPAattack in Section 3.2.2, the attacker is so lucky that he can explicitly get
the value of the target bit in Eq. (3) corresponding to the message M after he makes an hypothesis
on the six bits of the underlined value in Eq. (3). However, it is obvious that he will not be so lucky
to get the value of the target bit depending on less than 32 key bits in Eq. (7), for after he makes an
hypothesis on the six bits of the underlined value inEq. (7), he has to compute S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))
from this hypothesized underlined value when he computes the value of some target bit in Eq. (7),
which will depend on more than 32 bits of key. On the other hand, only after he knows all the 32
bits of S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63)) could he compute the value of the target bit in Eq. (7). This incurs a
main difference between our following attack and Akkar et al.’s enhanced DPA attack in Section
3.2.2.
Fortunately, we exploit a new technique to correctly classify the 1000 electric consumption curves
corresponding to some 1000 (for example) inputs. Note in Eq. (7) that given K1, if IP(M)32−63 is set
to some arbitrary but ﬁxed value, then S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63)) will also be ﬁxed. So if we classify the
1000 electric consumption curves corresponding to the 1000 inputs (the right 32 bits of eachmessage
after IP is ﬁxed to a constant) according to some target bit in Eq. (7), we can also classify them to
the same two groups according to the corresponding bit of
S(E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))))⊕ E(IP(M)0−31)⊕ K2). (8)
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Therefore, similar to Akkar et al.’s DPA attack in Section 3.2.2, we can perform a DPA attack
with some chosen messages to acquire the value of K2 ⊕ E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63)))) and then per-
form another DPA attack with some different chosen messages to acquire a similar value. Finally,
we can retrieve the key K1 by taking XOR of the two acquired values.
We will show the details of our attack in the following section.
4.2. Our concrete attack
Step 1: During Eq. (8), letting
 = K2 ⊕ E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63)))),
we now study on the following equation
 = S( ⊕ E(IP(M)0−31)).
Step 2: We ﬁx the right 32 bits IP(Mi)32−63 of a message Mi after the initial IP to an arbitrary but
constant MR, and choose 1000 (for example) random 32-bit MLi (i = 1, 2, . . . , 1000) as the
left 32 bits of the 1000 inputs after IP. As what we describe in Section 2, by using these 1000
inputs, we can obviously apply a DPA attack to acquire R,
R = K2 ⊕ E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(MR)))). (9)
Step 3: By changingMR to another different one MR∗ , we can acquire the corresponding R∗ ,
R∗ = K2 ⊕ E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(MR∗)))). (10)
Step 4: By taking XOR of Eqs. (9) and (10), we get the following equation,
R⊕R∗ = K2 ⊕ E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(MR∗))))⊕ K2 ⊕ E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(MR))))
= E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(MR∗))))⊕ E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(MR)))). (11)
Step 5: From Eq. (11), we get
S(K1 ⊕ E(MR∗))⊕ S(K1 ⊕ E(MR)) = P−1(E−1(R ⊕ R∗)). (12)
Note that Eq. (12) is similar to Eq. (4) except the values of the four known parametersMR∗ ,MR, R∗
and R, so this again gives us 48 · 28 = 224 possibilities on the key. Consequently, as mentioned by
Akkar et al. in [3], an exhaustive search with one known plaintext/ciphertext pair will take only a
few seconds on a PC.
Therefore, Akkar et al.’s improved DES implementation using Unique Masking Method is still
vulnerable to DPA attack.
Note: By ﬁxing the right 32 bits of each message after IP to some arbitrary value and letting
the left 32 bits change to get the enough inputs, we can correctly get the underlined value in Eq. (7)
and K1 simultaneously by performing a superposition attack similar to the one in Section 3.1.2.
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5. Our four new attacks on Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking
Method
Instead of using the outputs of the S-Boxes of the ﬁrst round and last round of Akkar and
Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method, our new attack uses the out-
puts of the S-Boxes of the ﬁrst two rounds, or the last two rounds, or the second round and the
last round, or the ﬁrst round and the last second round. The main idea of the attack using the ﬁrst
two rounds or the last two rounds is similar to the attack in Section 4.1, while the attack using the
second round and the last round, or the ﬁrst round and the last second round, is somewhat similar
to the superposition attack in Section 3.1.2.
5.1. Attacks using the ﬁrst two rounds or the last two rounds
During Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method in
Section 3.1.1, we can see that,
Step 1: The output of the SM-Box of the ﬁrst round is
S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))⊕ P−1(IP(X)32−63 ⊕ IP(X)0−31). (13)
Step 2: The output of the SM-Box of the second round is
S (E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63)))⊕ IP(M)0−31 ⊕ IP(X)32−63)
⊕K2 ⊕ E(IP(X)32−63))⊕ P−1(IP(X)32−63 ⊕ IP(X)0−31)
= S(E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))))⊕ E(IP(M)0−31)⊕ K2)
⊕P−1(IP(X)32−63 ⊕ IP(X)0−31). (14)
Step 3: By taking XOR of the two values of Eqs. (13) and (14)(that is, XOR the outputs of the
S-Boxes of the ﬁrst and second rounds), then we get the following
S (E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))))⊕ K2 ⊕ E(IP(M)0−31))⊕ S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63)).
Therefore, the random value P−1(IP(X)32−63 ⊕ IP(X)0−31) vanishes.
Step 4: In the following, we can perform an attack similar to the one in Section 4.2.
Similarly, by using the outputs of the S-Boxes of the last two rounds, we can perform another
attack on Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method, which
is a chosen ciphertext attack. Since the right part of the ﬁnal output of Akkar and Giraud’s DES
implementation using Transformed Masking Method is still required to be set to a arbitrary but
constant value as in the above attack, the attacker could succeed only if he could collect the required
enough outputs that have the same right 32 bits. Anyway, this attack threatens Akkar andGiraud’s
DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method.
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5.2. Attacks using the second round and the last round or the ﬁrst round and the last second round
We assume that C is the output corresponding to the input M . Then the value before the
Final Permutation is IP−1(C), therefore we can get the output, L16||R16, of the last round as R16 =
IP−1(C)0−31,L16 = IP−1(C)32−63. Finally, we can deduce out the output L15||R15 of the 15th round
and the output L14||R14 of the 14th round as follows:
R15 = IP−1(C)32−63,
L15(= R14) = P(S(K16 ⊕ E(IP(C)32−63)))⊕ IP−1(C)0−31, (15)
L14 = P(S(E(P(S(K16 ⊕ E(IP(C)32−63))))⊕ K15 ⊕ E(IP−1(C)0−31)))⊕ IP−1(C)32−63.
By using Eq. (15), we can get the XOR of the outputs of S-Boxes of the second round and the
last round in Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method as
follows:
S (K2 ⊕ E(R1))⊕ S(K16 ⊕ E(R15))
= S(K2 ⊕ E(P(S(K1 ⊕ E(IP(M)32−63))))⊕ E(IP(M)0−31))⊕ S(K16 ⊕ E(IP−1(C)32−63)). (16)
Therefore, the random value P−1(IP(X)32−63 ⊕ IP(X)0−31) vanishes, again.
Then, after by ﬁxing the right 32 bits of each message after IP to some arbitrary value and letting
the left 32 bits change to get the enough inputs, we can easily get the correct underlined value in Eq.
(16) and K16 simultaneously by performing a High-Order DPA attack similar to the superposition
attack in Section 3.1.2, given that we could choose the inputs and get their respective outputs.
The case for the ﬁrst and the last second rounds is similar except that we should get the enough
outputs that have the same right 32 bits, which may be impossible in practice, but in theory it is
feasible.
6. Conclusions
In CHES’01, Akkar and Giraud presented a Transformed Masking Method to defend the DPA
attack and applied it to DES implementation. Unfortunately, by using the outputs of the S-Boxes
of the ﬁrst and last rounds, Akkar and Goubin showed in FSE’03 a High-Order DPA attack on
Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method, and ﬁnally they
presented a DES implementation using their proposed Unique Masking Method to defend any
order DPA attacks, which was later improved by Akkar, Bévan and Goubin in [3]. However, in
this paper, we show that Akkar, Bévan andGoubin’s improved DES implementation using Unique
Masking Method is still vulnerable to DPA attacks. We also presented four new DPA attacks
on Akkar and Giraud’s DES implementation using Transformed Masking Method. A new tech-
nique to classify the electric consumption curves corresponding to the inputs is introduced in this
paper.
As a further work, Lv et al. [21] summarized and proved ﬁve basic requirements for a DES im-
plementation using masking methods to defense High-Order DPA attacks, and then presented an
enhancement onAkkar et al.’s DES implementation usingUniqueMaskingMethod. The enhanced
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DES implementation requires only three random 32-bit masks and six additional S-Boxes to be
generated every computation, which was proved to be the minimal cost for a DES implementation
masking all the outputs of the S-Boxes of the sixteen rounds to be secure against High-Order DPA
attacks.
In November 2001, NIST declared the advanced encryption standard—AES [29] for the next
generation. Nowadays, just as the referee mentioned, DES is becoming older and older for regular
computing applications, though it is still alive in the smart-card world with its extremely limited
computational resources. We hope those results obtained on DES so far could be taken on AES.
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